Electronic voting
machines, many with a touch screen feature, now account for at least 20
percent of all voting systems and many more will be installed in the next year.
The problem is that these machines are
subject to manipulation and malfunction, and there is no way to know when
this happens. This means that we cannot trust the results of elections and that
a major basis of our democracy, open and honest elections, is severely
compromised.
There is a solution,
though—requiring an independent paper printout that allows the voter to confirm
that the machine is recording what the voter intended, and that also can be
used to audit the vote totals that the machine reports. But few current voting machines are set up to
create such a voter-verifiable audit trail (VVAT).
There is no adequate national legislation to address this
issue. If this situation is not
corrected, it is not an exaggeration to say we will have lost our democracy.
The public and our political representatives are largely unaware of
the seriousness of the problem. While a number of articles in the press have
addressed some aspects of the issue, they have been overshadowed by media
coverage of the war with Iraq
and other issues.
Coverage by the media
has been minimal, considering the significance of this issue for the future
of American democracy. Further, the
nature of print coverage has been inadequate. It has obscured the overwhelming importance
of technical considerations, which are not adequately addressed by the typical
inclusion of anecdotal comments of citizens about how much they like voting
machines or manufacturers’ assertions that amount to “just trust us.”
Election security is
an urgent matter. Spurred by the Florida
election fiasco in 2000, Congress passed the “Help America Vote Act of 2002”
(HAVA). Using HAVA-designated monies,
states across the country are rushing to adopt new voting technology, primarily
touch-screen electronic machines, in time for the 2004 election. Unfortunately,
the provisions of HAVA are inadequate to guarantee that the electronic voting
machines will not be subject to manipulation, and that thewith
an independent VVAT that is
an accurate record of the intent of each individual voter. Once these machines
have been purchased and the systems are in place, it will be much harder to go
back to try to change them or disqualify them. We must act now.
A bill, HR 2239, “Voter Confidence and Increased
Accessibility Act of 2003,” has been submitted in Congress by Rep. Rush
Holt. This bill appears to address many
of the concerns about electronic voting machines. However, unless the media
deal with the issue more appropriately and the public is able to understand
what will be needed to have confidence in the outcome of elections, neither
this bill nor any other proposed legislation is likely to get the attention it
deserves. The public must know what is
going on and be motivated to pressure Congress to take action.
Commonweal Institute
has a project designed to bring the electronic voting machine problem to the
attention of the public and our elected officials. We will seek to get
sufficient attention for the seriousness of the problem, so that the public and
many elected officials will demand that there be at least a partial solution
prior to the 2004 general election. We
need support for this project now.
Goals of the
Trustworthy Electronic Voting Project are:
- Making
electronic voting machine vulnerability a major national media story
- Ensuring
media attention to the key point: That we must be able to trust election results, and this is not
possible without a voter-verifiable system
- Getting
citizens to contact their members of Congress to demand action.
The project will
involve:
·
Researching
media coverage of the issue to date;
·
Using the
research results to pressure the media to focus on the critical importance
of trustworthiness of the voting
process, by creating impact at the Radio & TV News Directors Assn, major
Journalism Reviews, awards shows, regional meetings of news managers, etc.;
·
Using
public relations techniques to publicize the issue widely; e.g., press
placement, press releases, faxblasts and email campaigns, tip sheets,
Fraudulent Voting Machine (online demonstration with citizen action tips), and
perhaps a newsworthy event;
·
Targeting
major moderate and progressive organizations that should be supporters, to
win their support or at least neutrality.
Some currently oppose voter verification because they do not understand
the seriousness of the threat to our democracy and their goals, nor the
significance of factors such as technology limitations, ownership of machine
companies, and the real potential for the manipulation of elections if touch
screen machines are used without a voter-verifiable audit trail.
·
Pushing
for widespread citizen action in communicating to Congress about this
issue, with the intention of having national legislation passed; this will be
done in collaboration with other organizations and individuals concerned with
the integrity of our elections system (e.g., MoveOn.org, California Voter
Foundation, People for the American Way, Professor David Dill of Stanford
University, Bev Harris of Black Box Voting).